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CONFLICTING IDEALS OF DEMOCRACY:
REFLECTIONS ON REFORM OF THE
DEMOCRATIC PROCESS
James S. Fishkin*
As a political theorist, my reaction to this Symposium is to argue that we cannot deal adequately with the narrow issue of campaign financing until we confront the broader issue of what vision of
democratic possibilities we should be aspiring to implement.
Once this point is made, however, it should be clear that we do
not have a unified and coherent democratic theory' which could simply be plugged into this debate. 2 Rather, we have competing democratic theories, 3 competing partial visions which conflict with one another. There are hard choices to be faced, even at the level of ideal
theory. Unless the full complexities of democratic theory are explicitly considered, they pose an impediment to campaign reform for at
least two reasons. First, a merely selective consideration of democratic values may produce reforms which improve on one dimension
while declining disastrously on another. Second, these complexities
undermine the accepted account of the relation between ideal theory
and second best, the accepted account-in other words, of the relation between our principles and our practices.'
I will sketch how this issue arises for democratic theory and
then will apply my argument more specifically to the reform of cam* Darrell K. Royal Regents Chair in Ethics and American Society and Professor of Government, Law and Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin. B.A. Yale University, 1970;
Ph.D. in political science, Yale University, 1975; Ph.D. in philosophy, University of Cambridge, 1976.
1. See R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 3 (1956) (asserting that there is
no singular distinct democratic theory).
2. See id. at 1.
3. See id. at 3 (noting that a minimal definition of democratic theory is a concern "with
the processes by which ordinary citizens, exert a relatively high degree of control over
leaders.").
4. See id. at 1-3 (discussing several definitions of democracy, and the effect of the particular theories on the values encompassed in the others).
5. See id.
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paign finance.
The basic point is that the democratic tradition has bequeathed
to us a variety of fundamental values at stake in democratic procedures, a variety of ideal images of what an appropriate collective
procedure might be. Because these ideal images cannot all be simultaneously realized, they require some hard choices. I believe that
Chart I provides a useful way of picturing the dimensions along
which this democratic debate tends to range. I have labelled the
North-South dimension "Madisonian" ' versus "Majoritarian. ' ' 7 By
Madisonian, I simply mean the degree to which the system includes
impediments of one sort or another to popular majorities." These impediments are usually justified, at least in theory, by a desire to prevent tyranny of the majority.9 Theoretically, the construction of impediments could go far beyond anything envisioned by Madison so
that, strictly speaking, a perfectly "Madisonian" system, in this
sense, would certainly not have been advocated by Madison.' 0 The
term "Madisonian" however, provides a useful label for a basic motivation underlying checks and balances, the territorial, federal and
bicameral character of many American representative arrangements,
the operation of judicial review and other institutions which serve as
impediments to majorities."' Alternatively, movement South along
the same dimension simply means that there are not effective impediments to popular majorities so that the latter tend to get their way.
As Dahl noted in a classic study, the American system is not very
6. See id. at 4 (stating that Madisonian democracy is defined as "an effort to bring off
a compromise between the power of majorities and the power of minorities.").
7. See id. at 4-33. Furthermore, the majoritarian dimension is roughly what he labels
"populistic." See id. at 34-62.
8. Madisonian theory defines such impediments as "external checks" which are "the
application of rewards or penalties, or the expectation that they will be applied [to the individual] by some source other than the given individual himself." Id. at 6.
9. However, while impediments to new policies will prevent tyranny through commission, they will not prevent tyranny through omission. For an extended discussion, see J.
FISHKIN, TYRANNY AND LEGITIMACY (1979). For an identification of the very idea of democracy with "limited majority rule" (limited so as to protect minorities), see G. SARTORI, THE
THEORY OF DEMOCRACY REVISITED § 2.4 (1987). Sartori's point is useful as a corrective to
common usage.
10.

Madison felt that certain impediments were necessary to prevent a "severe depriva-

tion of a natural right." R. DAHL, supra note 1, at 3. However, impediments designed to
protect against anything less than a "severe deprivation" would not have been advocated by

Madison. See id. at 6-7.
1I, See THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (J. Madison) (warning against the "accumulation of all
powers ... in the same hands" as being "the very definition of tyranny.").
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majoritarian. 12 With a system of "minorities rule" it is somewhere in
the upper right hand quadrant of the diagram."3
I
(unanimous
Madisonian
direct democracy)
(avoiding tyranny)
D

-

A

Indirect
(competence)

Direct
(participation)
C<

(majoritarian
cable democracy)

B

Majoritarian
(popular control)

CHART I
The East-West dimension is the familiar one of the degree to
which the system is indirect (representative) or direct (relying on the
participation of members without the intermediary of representatives). For both the North-South and East-West dimensions, many
difficult judgments of degree would be required to make any precise
comparisons. The main strength of the diagram is its ambition to
capture a wide range of debate and a variety of conflicting images
within a single space, so as to clarify how gains in one value can be
expected to require costs in another.
As a point of reference, the American system would fit, on balance, somewhere in the upper right hand quadrant. To varying degrees most parliamentary systems would fit somewhere to the south
of the American system. Depending on the impediments that these
systems offered to popular majorities, they might fit in the lower por12. See R. DAHL, supra note 1, at 124-33.
13. See id. at 132 (stating that "the specific policies selected by a process of 'minorities
rule' probably lie most of the time within the bounds of consensus set by important values of
the politically active members of the society.").

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1989

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 5
HOFSTR,4 LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:395

tion of the Northeast quadrant or the upper portion of the Southeast
one.
The Western positions in the diagram are most usefully captured by certain extreme ideal images. Suppose, for example that the
Warner-Amex QUBE system in Columbus, Ohio14 were used for actual government policy making. In the QUBE system, each resident
can respond immediately on any question posed on the two-way
cable TV system. 15 Constant referendums are thus feasible on all
public questions. Some would regard instantaneous, majoritarian direct democracy as the peifect embodiment of a certain influential,
17
ideal image.' 6 Others would regard it as a reductio ad absurdum.
In any case, any extreme version would fit the lower left hand corner
of the diagram.
By contrast, Robert Paul Wolff's proposal for unanimous direct
democracy 18 fits the extreme upper left position. The unanimity rule
gives everyone a veto, providing the greatest possible protection from
tyranny of the majority from new policies.' It would not provide
protection from omissions,20 but that is not an issue we need pursue
here. The placement of unanimous direct democracy in the upper
left corner and the placement of majoritarian direct democracy in
the lower left corner illustrates how extreme direct systems (both
implementable through a two-way cable system) can be crucially
different on our North-South dimension.
This diagram can be used to show not only that there are fundamental conflicts in our ideal images of democracy, but also that
14, "QUBE" is "interactive television, a two-way cable system that enables viewers to
respond in their homes to questions flashed on the screen." Elshtain, Democracy and the
QUBE Tube, NATION, Aug. 7-14, 182, at 108.
15. See id.
16. See id. (discussing the arguments in favor of such a system).
17. See id. at 108-10 (discussing the problems associated with the use of such a system).
As part of the argument, Elshtain noted that the citizen using QUBE gives "an instant 'opinion' rather than concurring or dissenting from a position hammered out through debate and
democratic discourse." Id. at 109. Elshtain further argued that "[t]o see button-pressing as a
choice, as a meaningful act on a par with marching in an antinuclear rally, lobbying against
toxic waste dumping or working for a political candidate, indicates our tacit embrace of a
crude version of the 'preference theory' of economics." Id.
18. See R. WOLFF. IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM 22-27 (1970) (defending unanimity as
the ideal solution to the conflict between authority and autonomy); see also J. BUCHANAN &
G. TULLOCK. THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 85-96 (1971) (granting the unanimity rule privileged status but arguing for a departure from it based on decision costs).
19. See R. WOLFF, supra note 18, at 23.
20. See J. FISHKIN, supra note 9, at 5-7 (explaining that the rule of unanimity only
protects individuals against governmental action, not inaction).
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there are fundamental conflicts in our notions of moral progress intended to realize those ideal images. We can get cycles in progress
toward democratic reform. I do not have in mind here the cycles
familiar to students of the classic voting paradox. 2 Cycles in applying particular democratic arrangements (for example, majority rule)
to policy or candidate choice can be distinguished from cycles in the
design of the democratic arrangement itself. How a cycle of democratic reforms might arise can be charted in Chart I.
Imagine an American style status quo, somewhere in the upper
right hand quadrant, point A in the diagram. Within the family of
arguments loosely counted as democratic, a variety of reforms might
be supported which would increase majority control over policy outcomes.2 2 I am not advocating these reforms, but only pointing out
that were they to come about, they could move the entire system
South, from A to B in the diagram.
From B it is possible to imagine a second line of reform based
on the argument that real democracy requires far greater direct participation. Even within the confines of a generally representative system, a number of reforms could be designed to move the system
Westward to a point such as C.23
From point C, the greater power in the hands of an aroused
populace might well produce calls for protection against tyranny of
the majority. Reinvigoration of the separation of powers, checks and
balances, and an activist judiciary determined to protect various constitutional rights could move the system from C to a point such as D,
directly North.
However, from point D arguments about the greater competence of representatives could be employed to undermine the earlier
proliferation of referendums, primaries, town meetings and other direct institutions, so as to return the system to our original status quo,
point A.
Each step in this scenario relies on values which are deeply
21. For a discussion of the conditions under which majority rule produces cycles violating transitivity see D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 38-49 (1979).
22. For example, the reforms could include proportional representation, reform of the
electoral college, a less activist or independent judiciary, or political control over the Federal
Reserve.

23. Some of the reforms that could be employed to move the system in this direction are
referendum and recall provisions, proliferation of direct primaries, town meetings and other

direct governing arrangements within specific jurisdictions. For some creative proposals along
these lines, see B. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY 261-311 (1984).
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rooted within the general family of democratic arguments.24 Movement South depends on emphasizing popular control; movement
West on participation as a value in itself; movement North on
preventing tyranny of the majority; movement East on the greater
competence of representatives. Depending on which of these partial
images is given greater emphasis, one can go round and round. Each
direction for reform has plausibility because of its emphasis on a
distinctive value. However, the end result is a kind of cycle which
makes it extremely difficult to determine which position is more
democratic in any defensible sense. Conflicting values in the identification of the ideal yield conflicting directions for moral progress-directions which, step by step, can take us back to where we
started.
This scheme demonstrates the impediments to any eagy inference that some scenario of reforms is more democratic. When we
have fundamental moral conflicts in the identification of the ideal, it
is not possible to incrementally approach realization of it and assume
that there is any defensible sense in which moral progress is made. 5
Yet over the last two decades, the American political system has
engaged in a series of reforms driven predominantly by what could
be classified as the Southwestern vision in Chart I. Anything more
direct and anything more majoritarian has commonly been regarded
as more democratic. This selective vision has fueled the extraordinary proliferation of primaries since 1968.10 Direct primaries achieve
the Southwestern vision of greater majority control and greater popular participation. However, they have the side-effect of greatly increasing the demand for money. 7 When states adopt direct primaries, they make television the principal battleground--creating a
24. In terms of recent American experience, the movement of the Democratic party
from the McGovern reforms in the Presidential selection system and then back to greater
control by party notables, is a movement roughly from A to B and back again to A, movements supported by differing images of democracy.
25. See generally Fishkin, The Complexity of Simple Justice, 98 ETHICS 464, 464-71
(1987-88) (explaining the general development of theories of justice).
26. See L. BARTELS, PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES AND THE DYNAMICS OF PUBLIC CHOICE 6
(1988) (noting that "the proliferation of primaries has increased the power of the active segment of the voting public that participates in primaries, at the expense of professional party
elites."); Ranney, Farewell to Reform-Almost, in ELECTIONS IN AMERICA 87, 92-93 (K.
Schlozman ed. 1987) (discussing the proliferation of primaries in recent years).
27. See Burnham, Elections as Democratic Institutions, in ELECTIONS IN AMERICA,
supra note 26, at 44-45 (reviewing the need for money in primary and general elections); cf. L.
BARTELS, supra note 26, at 154 (discussing the large amount of money candidates must spend
on the New Hampshire primary alone).
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nearly insatiable demand for money for television advertising."
Hence, the campaign finance problem is partly the result of a
selective vision of democracy. Innovative finance proposals, such as
the one put forward by Lowenstein, z9 take as a given the new battleground of direct primaries along with the Southwestern vision of democracy which has justified it. Such proposals do not quarrel with
the need for vast amounts of money, they only deal with the question
of source. But the need for massive amounts of television expenditure
is a bit like a drug addiction. Lowenstein would make the government the principal supplier.30 Gottlieb, fearful of unanticipated side
effects of reform, would let the market be the supplier.31 I would
rather raise the issue of whether the addiction can be treated or
overcome.
Such a harsh metaphor implies that there may be something
pernicious in the role of television advertising. However, all this Article claims is that the democratic system which results is fundamentally flawed. This country has been moving in a southwesterly direction on Chart I in a manner that produces a far less defensible
version of democracy. To dramatize thig claim, let us add a third
dimension to the diagram, called "Reflective versus Unreflective,"
which represents an account of the quality of information at the level
at which effective decisions are being made. If decisions are made
merely at an elite level, then we are talking merely of elite information. But if they are democratized to a mass level, then the quality of
information at the mass level must be considered. This new diagram
now has three dimensions, North-South, East-West and InnerOuter.3 2 The mere fact of a move toward the Southwest should not
be taken to represent an improvement. Once it becomes clear that
the move corresponds to an outer (less reflective) rather than inner
(more reflective) system, the case for the change being an improvement collapses.

28. See F. SORAUF, MONEY IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS 25-26 (1988) (exploring the history of television's impact on campaigning); Burnham, supra note 27, at 45 (explaining the
relationship between the candidate's use of television and spending).
29. See Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of all Evil is Deeply
Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. Rav. 301, 351-60 (1989).
30. See id. (suggesting expanded public financing and limited private contributions).
31. See Gottlieb, The Dilemma of Election Campaign FinanceReform, 18 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 213 (1989).
32. The "Inner-Outer" dimension is also referred to in this Article as the "Reflective
versus Unreflective" dimension.
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CHART II

Of course, there are many specific issues that would have to be
faced were such a scheme to be operationalized. It is only necessary
to hypothesize here that were such a full scale effort to be undertaken, we would find that the proliferation of direct primaries has
led to a war of sound bites and media packages, without real improvement in the reflective character of citizen preferences or information. Hence, the movement of effective decision-making for contested primaries, particularly in the presidential nominating system,
to a mass level and away from the party elites, cannot be offered as
an improvement in the reflective character of decision-making. In
fact, it is probably a net decrease.
It is not necessary to deal here with the thorny question of judging the extent of the decrease. I make the point only to raise a different question as an issue for further research and debate: Are there
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possible reforms which might be expected to move the system in an
inner (or more reflective) direction in the diagram while also staying
within an acceptable range on the other dimensions?
This Article considers two possible reforms. The first one is directed at the use of political money in the broader political environment. 3 The second one is aimed at the structure of the presidential
nominating system itself.3 4 Both reforms are extremely speculative
and are proposed solely to stimulate debate about the theory of democracy we should be aspiring to implement. 5
Suppose every member is given a voucher to represent her chosen interests. 36 The voucher must be substantial enough so that organizations will want to compete for each voucher. The vouchers can
only be cashed in at yearly intervals, by organizations that satisfy
some minimum regulatory requirements.37 Since each member has a
voucher, there will be incentives for organizations to compete with
each other to speak for the underclass, the dispossessed, the invisible
and the quiescent. Some organizations may well be created just to
monitor other organizations. Provided that the barriers to entry in
this competition are kept low, there will be a continual dynamism in
the creation of organizations and hence, in the creation of effective
voices, where before there had been only silence and indifference.
To create a more reflective political culture at the mass level, it
is necessary to overcome several problems. First, there is the collective action problem standing as an impediment to individual participation. 38 Second, there is the scarcity and maldistribution of organizational resources-so that it is quite predictable that some groups
will have difficulty engaging in the collective political dialogue.3"
33. See infra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 44-62 and accompanying text.
35. These reforms are distinct from Lowenstein's proposals in that they include no practical calculations about their political viability or their likelihood of being adopted (in both

cases, very low in my estimation). See Lowenstein, supra note 29, at 360-66.
36. This voucher proposal is the product of a working group at the Center for Advanced
Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford during 1987-88 with Claus Offe and Philippe

Schmitter. They have their own distinctive versions of this proposal. For a synopsis of critics
and proponents of voucher systems in the areas of housing and eduction, see B. BARBER, supra
note 23, at 293-98.
37. These regulations would basically ensure that the organizations are not fraudulent,

that they are not for profit, and that they act appropriately to represent the interests they
claim to represent.
38. For a detailed discussion of the collective action problem, see generally R. HARDIN,
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982).
39. The groups will have difficulty competing for expertise and for the opportunity for
an effective hearing. See D. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 50-55 (1988)
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Third, some "groups" may never get to the point where they constitute themselves as groups. They may lack the resources and infrastructure to organize; they may lack the collective consciousness to
even realize the need.4 0 It is plausible to believe that representation
vouchers would do a great deal to solve these three basic problems
over the long term. These vouchers would give organizations incentives to take seriously the interests of those now left out of the dialogue. Or, if established organizations failed to adjust, "issue entrepreneurs" would have a strong incentive to fill the gap. 4 '
Correspondingly, individuals would have no incentive to be free-riders because the costs of participation are only the assignment of a
voucher which cannot be spent on anything else. In fact, if computerized records are kept concerning who has assigned her voucher, the
costs of failing to participate would be the possible inconvenience of
continued solicitations and continued competition for representation.
People would have a strong incentive to think about the problem and
make a decision. Thus, attempting to be a free rider (in the sense of
doing nothing) might well be more costly than participating. Nonparticipation would produce its own negative incentive, its own motivation to overcome apathy. Most importantly, representation vouchers would alter the present scarcity of organizational resources, a
scarcity now skewed in favor of those with other resources. Just as
class action suits and public interest research organizations have partially opened up the representation and advocacy of interests that
were previously unvoiced,42 representation vouchers would do the
same-but by creating incentives for the continual, competitive creation of new organizations. Vouchers would bring a kind of political
equality to the creation of political action committees (PACs).
Whether PACs would be prohibited or merely supplemented by this
new kind of organization is an issue that would need a great deal of
careful research.
Representation vouchers focus on the political environment
within which politicians operate. What about the political process
itself? As I have said before:
The Presidential nominating system has been reformed and the reforms have been reformed, and now the reformed reforms have
(discussing why some groups are not formed).

40. See Id.
41.

See id. at 43 (discussing the incentives that exist to promote entrepreneurs to organ-

ize groups).
42.

See id. at 369 (evaluating the democratic'impact of class action suits).
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themselves been subject to reform. The system that nominated Hubert Humphrey in 1968 has been democratized and popularized-made more dependent upon primaries and participation by
the rank and file. Although the larger number of primaries ensures
that the system will never return to its former state, the pendulum
has swung partway back. For example, awarding party leaders
spots as "superdelegates" assures them more influence on the process than they had when Jimmy Carter was first nominated, in
1976. But whatever the degree of counter-reform, the changes back
and forth have moved withifi too narrow a range of options, and too
constricted a vision of democratic possibilities. Our tinkering with
the system has been constricted by a false dilemma: that we must
choose between the competence of elites-well-informed but antidemocratic-and the superficialities of mass democracy. Either we
have smoke-filled rooms or we end up choosing our candidates
more or less the way we choose detergents."3
In our three dimensional diagram, this is the choice between an
Outer-Southwestern position and an Inner-Northeastern one, the
choice between unreflective mass participation and reflective elite
participation.
I have previously suggested the possibility of preempting the familiar Iowa and New Hampshire primaries with what I have called
a "National Caucus.""" The proposal is to take a sample of around
1500 citizens that were as nationally representative as possible, and
transport them to a single site for several weeks, during which all of
the candidates for each party would make appearances.4 5 These appearances would be in both individual and debate formats, with
many being open to national television, and with some that would be
private and more informal.
The participants in this National Caucus would eventually select some at-large delegates to the national conventions."6 With the
National Caucus positioned as the first event, the rest of the primary
season can proceed as it currently does. This proposal is not intended
to replace the race for the Presidency as we know it; rather, it is
intended to alter the way the race begins.
43. Fishkin, The Casefor a National Caucus: Taking Democracy Seriously, ATLANTIC,
Aug. 1988, at 16-17.
44. See id. at 16 (presenting a more complete outline of this proposal).
45. The proposal envisions that delegates would choose, at the beginning, whether to
attend the Republican or Democratic proceedings. See id.
46. As I have noted "[t]he number of delegates devoted to this purpose need not be
large. The mass media will magnify them in importance in any case." Id.
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The National Caucus would have a significant impact on the
most striking fact about the operation of the presidential selection
system-as it has been progressively democratized-the role of "momentum." The enormous effect of early victories and defeats on the
results of later primaries and caucuses has been persuasively demonstrated by Larry Bartels' recently published study.4
Presently, the winnowing of candidates is extremely "frontloaded". Season after season, two states, Iowa and New Hampshire,
make the first cut for the rest of the United States.48 Thus, the initial choice that limits the candidates is made by two states that have
almost no minority populations and that lack the urban concentrations of the nation's "mega-states. ' '41 The problem presented by this
"front-loaded" system could be remedied, in theory, by putting different states at the beginning. A serious consideration of the issue,
however, leads to the recognition of deeper problems.
My proposal focuses on "small scale" politics, involving face-toface interaction, with little mediation by newspapers or television. 0
This type of system would facilitate a far more informed initial winnowing, and it would do so in a way that harnesses incentives for
candidates, who are, after all, the "issue entrepreneurs" with high
47. See generally L. BARTELS, supra note 26 (analyzing the concept 6f "momentum"
throughout the election process).
48. These are the first two primaries of the election "season." As I have noted, this
"front-loaded" process means that "the Bruce Babbits and Pete Du Ponts are out of the race
before they can be presented to electorates that come later in the queue." Fishkin, supra note
43, at 17; see also L. BARTELS, supra note 26, at 7 (noting that "the importance of early
results in generating momentum has given disproportional influence to states whose primaries
or caucuses happen to occur early in the nominating season.").
49. For example, New York, California, Illinois, Massachusetts and Texas.
50. I have previously made the distinction between "wholesale" politics, "mass-retail"
politics and "small scale" politics:
When the candidates campaign for Super Tuesday, attempting to cover twenty-one
jurisdictions with limited campaign resources in a short period of time, they are
limited to wholesale politics. They buy whatever television advertising they can and
spread it thinly over a vast population.
Mass-retail politics is practiced in Iowa and New Hampshire, for example. The
candidates make many visits, shake many hands, engage in local debates. The advertising for the serious candidate is plentiful enough that the voters have a chance,
if they are motivated, to associate names with faces and, perhaps, to develop betterinformed opinions.
Fishkin, supra note 43, at 17.
Wholesale politics involve virtually no substantive content. Candidates travel from airport
to airport just to surface on the evening news with a brief, smiling appearance. During this
time they hope their opponents will make some mistake or that they can somehow get as much
free media attention as possible. Wholesale politics is not, by itself, a contribution to more
reflective political dialogue.
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visibility, in order to address and articulate the interests of every
significant constituency in the country.51 This proposal is intended to
adapt the self-reflective possibilities of small scale politics to the
problem of selecting candidates and issues in a large-scale nationstate.52
Until the latter part of the eighteenth century, philosophers
often regarded democracy as a curiosity restricted to small scale
politics. It was a form of government appropriate for city-states.
Rousseau thought the conditions for democracy were most appropriate in his native Geneva-which had a population in his time of
about 22,000. 5' Aristotle had previously prescribed that all citizens
should be able to gather together and still hear a speaker.54 Without
modern technology, this constituted an even more restrictive limit.
Only the crucial innovation of representation permitted the
democratic idea to be adapted to the large-scale nation-state. But we
have been struggling ever since to accomplish the adaptation in a
manner that would preserve some of the attractive qualities of smallscale democracy for the large-scale version.55
The benefit of small-scale democracy is that it permits a politics
of face-to-face interaction." The delegates to the National Caucus
would' eventually see what the candidates were like without their
51. In fact, "[t]his caucus would constitute a kind of national laboratory for the growth
of new issues as well as for the emergence of new candidates. Some of those issues can be
expected to prove viable outside of the laboratory-they will take on lives of their own in the
succeeding months." Id.
52. I have noted that a more carefully designed-collective system for launching presidential campaign issues makes sense "[s]ince campaigning is now all but perpetual ... ." Id. at
17. "These issues set the terms of debate for a large part of our political system." Id.
For a discussion of this type of political interaction in our society, see Laslett, The Face to
Face Society, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIErY 157 (P. Laslett ed. 1956).
53. R. DAHL & E. TuFTE, SIZE AND DEMOCRACY 1 (1973). As Dahl and Tufte further
noted:
[I]t is worth recalling that some of the city-states of greatest cultural creativity in
Western history-Athens in the age of Pericles, republican Rome, Venice, .Siena,
Florence, to name a few-had populations about the size of present-day Iceland and
were very much smaller than, say, Norway or Finland. The Renaissance began in
what would now be considered small towns .... Thus, it is difficult to make a case
for a relation between population size and creativity.
Id. at 116-17.
54. Id. at 5. Aristotle further argued that "the optimum must lie between a population
so small that the polis could not be self-sufficient and so large that the citizens could no longer
know one another's characters." Id.
55. See R. DAHL & E. TutTE, supra note 53, at 136-42 (presenting a compelling overview of the problem of adapting small scale democracy in a large nation-state).
56. See Laslett, supra note 52, at 165-66. This is particularly true because it would lack
mediation by newspapers or television. See Fishkin, supra note 43, at 17.
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standard stump speeches, 7 without media packaging for television
and without "spin doctors" 5 8 to protect their image.5
Under the proposal in this Article, the first winnowing of candidates would have the benefits of both the thoughtfulness and depth
of small-scale, face-to-face politics, and the representative character
of a national event. It offers a way out of the false dilemma which
has trapped previous reforms. The National Caucus is not elitist because it is representative of ordinary citizens, and because it would
permit the thoughtfulness of small-scale interactions to replace the
comparative superficialities of the mass-retail and wholesale versions.
My proposal, the National Caucus, is not an organ of the political professionals. It would use the sampling techniques of public
opinion research6 ° to represent and make present a version of all
Americans. It offers a rebuttal to the charge of elitism which has
discredited the Northeastern dimension of our democratic space,6" in
a way that might move the system in an Inner rather than an Outer
direction so as to improve the reflective character of effective decision-making. 2
These reforms are suggested as a way of beginning a dialogue,
rather than as a way of ending one. The possibility of reforms that
would deepen the democratic experience needs to be placed on our
collective intellectual agenda. We should not increase participation,
however, without also worrying about the quality of preferences citizens bring to their participation. Money should not be provided for
57. As a result of repeated informal appearances to the same audience, candidates could
not give the same speech over and over.

58. As a recent article noted:
"Spin doctors," as they came to be known in the last presidential campaign, practice
a not-so-fine art of press manipulation. The goal is generally to make bad news hurt
less (e.g. "third in Iowa, my God we're delighted, its a springboard for New Hampshire!") and good news helps more (e.g. "the real test will be in . . .[pick state
where you've already spent twice as much as your opposition]").
Estrich & Sullivan, Webster v. Reproductive-Health Services; Abortion Politics Writing For
an Audience of One, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 119 (1989).
59. "It would be as if the delegates were in The Wizard of Oz and had a chance to go
behind the green curtain and see what their would-be national leaders were really
like-without benefit of hocus-pocus and amplification." Fiskin, supra note 43, at 17.
60. For a discussion of sampling techniques, see generally J. NETTER, APPLIED STA'rSTiCS 346-64 (1982).
61. See generally E. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE 215-17 (1988); R. WOLFF, supra
note 18, at 39; Crotty, Party Reform, Nominating Processes and Democratic Ends, in ELECTIONS IN AMERICA, supra note 26, at 64-65.
62. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text (discussing inner versus outer
movement).
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political competition without careful consideration about the kinds of
events in which the politicians are competing. Adequate reforms cannot deal with campaign finance in isolation and they cannot be based
on overly selective visions of democracy. These points are not offered
as a criticism of the positions my colleagues have taken in the current debate; rather they are offered as an attempt to change the
topic.
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